If you can figure out the cultural psychology around your idea, you might be able to find a product market fit faster.
The past three weeks have been a deep hole of research for me, and so as I finally come up for air, I am curious to share what I've been looking at as a concept that can inform why some companies win, and why others do not. I've spent the past three weeks placing 2,029 companies on the Overton window.
No real goal in mind, I just was on a run and thought about the concept and wondered if there would be anything in there for my offer creation in my businesses. Turns out, I learned a lot.
I became aware of the Overton window, don't judge me, because of a piece of content years ago that aligned Kanye West's music as out on the fringe, and how artists typically take ideas, and make the unthinkable, acceptable; popular, even.
I wanted to know whether the thing political strategists use to explain how an idea goes from unthinkable to law could explain how an offer goes from a weird pitch to the default thing people buy. Turns out it probably can. And it tells you more about positioning and go-to-market than any framework I have used in 15 years of doing this.
The Overton Buying Cycle
Joseph Overton described the idea in the 1990s. His point was that a politician can only support the ideas the public is already willing to accept. He called that range of acceptable ideas the window. The window moves over time, usually slowly, and ideas that once seemed unthinkable can end up as policy without anyone ever announcing that the change happened.
Swap "the public" for "your buyers" and you get seven bands - I changed the cluster that falls behind Policy to generally... "behind". Read them as what a buyer is willing to do, not as how good the idea is.
- Behind. The window has passed over it. Still sells, priced as a commodity, and the buyer is comparing quotes.
- Policy. The default. Everyone buys it this way. A buyer does not need to be sold, only chosen.
- Popular. Widely bought, crowded, well funded. A buyer knows the category and is comparing options.
- Sensible. Serious money, some doubt. A buyer gets it once it is explained and will pay for it.
- Acceptable. Fundable with a good story. Only early buyers will act, and they need proof.
- Radical. A few true believers. Buyers are rare. Investors are the customer.
- Unthinkable. Most people say no. Nobody buys. Somebody funds.
What's in the data?
I placed every company twice, where its idea sat relative to consensus the year it was founded and where it sits today. Then I put money next to each one. Total funding raised for startups, annual revenue for operating businesses. The 51 verticals run from AI, chips, and biotech through oil and gas, utilities, construction, trades, auto dealers, grocery, insurance, REITs, senior care, and equipment rental. A good share of them are Oklahoma companies, because I wanted to see where the businesses I actually work with land - some are just companies that I have used and so I picked them.
Don't hate me. I'm not picking on your brand. 🙂
My data is sourced from publicly accessible data and a bit of math on how you can culturally calculate where they were in the stage. Here's my formula:
Questions 1-5 (distance from consensus): q1 Do buyers already search for this by name? q2 Do they already pay someone for this exact thing? q3 Can you explain it without "it's like X, but"? q4 Can they buy it without changing a habit? q5 Would your banker call it a normal business? Questions 6-8 (crowding and replacement): q6 Are there five or more competitors selling it? q7 Do buyers mostly choose on price? q8 Is software, DIY, or a bigger player replacing it? D = number of "no" answers among q1-q5 (0 to 5) C = number of "yes" answers among q6-q7 (0 to 2) R = 1 if q8 is "yes", else 0 Band = 0 Behind if R = 1 and D <= 1 1 Policy if D = 0 and C = 2 2 Popular if D = 0 and C < 2 3 Sensible if D = 1 4 Acceptable if D = 2 5 Radical if D = 3 6 Unthinkable if D >= 4
The statistics in this article are then plain arithmetic on the placements.
For a company i: s_i = founding band, t_i = today band, m_i = dollars
Moved inward = count(t_i < s_i and t_i > 0) = 1,227
Fell behind = count(t_i = 0) = 225
Held = count(t_i = s_i) = 571
Moved outward = count(t_i > s_i) = 6
Reached consensus from band b = count(s_i = b and t_i in {1, 2}) / count(s_i = b)
Fell behind from band b = count(s_i = b and t_i = 0) / count(s_i = b)
Median dollars at band b, type k = median(m_i : t_i = b, type_i = k)
k = startup (total funding) or operating business (annual revenue)
Fell-behind rate for vertical v = count(t_i = 0, vertical_i = v) / count(vertical_i = v)
One note on those. "Reached consensus" counts Policy and Popular together, so the Sensible 91 percent means 91 percent now sit at band 1 or 2.
Three things hold up as you read the data.
Almost nothing moves outward. 1,452 companies moved toward consensus from where they started. 571 were founded at consensus and stayed. Six moved outward, and most of those are collapses like FTX and Theranos. When an idea finds fit, the market usually catches up to it over time. That's the normal path.
Investors pay for distance. Customers pay for familiar. The median startup at Radical has raised $600 million. At Policy, $335 million. Flip to revenue and it inverts. The median operating business at Policy does $4.2 billion a year. At Popular, $500 million. At Sensible, $249 million. There are 1,280 operating businesses at Policy today and 23 at Sensible. There are two at Acceptable and none further out.
The window keeps moving after you arrive. 225 companies sit at Behind. They are not small. The median one does $900 million a year.
Each Band as a Buyer State
Here is who started at each band, what happened to them, and what the buyer at that band is actually doing.
Unthinkable. 177 companies were founded here. 17 percent reached consensus. 71 percent are still out there. The ones who made it are the names everybody uses as proof that you should bet big: Tesla, SpaceX, Uber, Airbnb, Genentech, Intuitive Surgical, Moderna, OpenAI. The ones still out are Blue Origin, Joby, Archer, Magic Leap, Commonwealth Fusion. The buyer at Unthinkable does not exist. The customer is the investor, and the sales cycle is measured in years. Nikola and Cruise started here too and went straight to Behind, which is what happens when the window never arrives and the money runs out.
Radical. 222 founded here. 47 percent reached consensus, 36 percent are still out, 17 percent fell behind. Amazon, Apple, Nvidia, FedEx, Netflix, Salesforce, PayPal, Anthropic. The buyer at Radical is a true believer, and there are not many of them. The fall-behind list matters more than the success list: Intel, WeWork, SiriusXM, Stitch Fix, Convoy, Katerra. Each of those was a Radical idea that made it to the middle and then stopped moving. Starting at Radical doesn't doom you, but it does mean you'll be placing new bets for as long as you're in business.
Acceptable. 393 founded here, the single biggest founding band for startups. 82 percent reached consensus. Google, Microsoft, Meta, TikTok, Nike, Starbucks, Visa, Mastercard, Oracle, Cisco. The buyer at Acceptable is an early adopter who will act on a good story and some proof. This is the band most venture-backed companies pitch from, and the odds here are good, but the sales cycle is three to nine months and you need runway or a core business paying the bills.
Sensible. 288 founded here. 91 percent reached consensus, the same rate as companies founded at consensus, and they arrived owning the position. Costco, Home Depot, Dell, Disney, T-Mobile, Accenture, GEICO, Zara, Broadcom, Temu. The buyer at Sensible needs one explanation and then pays. Few direct comparisons exist, so the price holds. Fell behind from here: HP, GE, Toys R Us, Blockbuster, RadioShack, Victoria's Secret, Silicon Valley Bank. Every one of those rode the original idea past the point where the window had moved.
Popular. 328 founded here. 88 percent are still at consensus, 12 percent fell behind. The buyer at Popular knows the category and is comparing you to four others. Fell behind: Charter, Nokia, Gap, Staples, Subway, Goodyear, US Steel, Paramount. These are the companies that won a crowded category and then let a cheaper or more convenient version of the category walk past them.
Policy. 621 founded here, the biggest band of all once you add operating businesses. 91 percent are still there. This is the trades, utilities, construction, insurance, distribution, rental. In those verticals the fall-behind rate is between zero and two percent. Mullin Plumbing, Airco, Manhattan Construction, Flintco, OGE, Dolese, Reasor's, United Site Services, AYS Rentals. The buyer at Policy already has this in the budget, and the only question left is who they buy it from. Nine percent fell behind anyway: Walgreens, Macy's, Kohl's, JCPenney, Rite Aid, Petco, and the ad holding companies, WPP, Omnicom, IPG, Dentsu, Havas.
Behind. 213 operating businesses. The buyer at Behind is comparing quotes, and the price drifts toward your entry tier every year. The verticals that fell behind at the highest rates: robotics 42 percent, media 41, telecom 41, fitness 40, agriculture 38, marketing 35, retail 33, staffing 32, restaurants 32. Marketing is the one I am in. Twelve of 34 agencies fell behind the window. The six that sit at Popular are Superside, Collins, Koto, Mischief, Designjoy, and Brandtech. Every one of them packaged the work as a product or sold the judgment instead of the production.
What does this show us about Buy-in?
Put the two money curves next to each other and the buy-in story is right there.
On the funding side the curve rises as you move outward. Policy $335 million, Popular $396 million, Sensible $490 million, Radical $600 million. Investors are paying for distance from consensus, because distance is where the upside is.
On the revenue side the curve collapses inward. Policy $4.2 billion. Popular $500 million. Sensible $249 million. Acceptable has two companies on it. Customers are paying for familiar, because familiar is what they can budget for, explain to the boss, and buy without changing a habit.
The two curves cross at Popular. That's the band where an idea stops being funded by people who believe in it and starts getting bought by people who need it, and almost everything about go-to-market changes there. Before that line you're creating demand, and after it you're capturing demand that already exists.
So I'd read the bands as a map of who is going to pay you. At Unthinkable and Radical it's investors. At Acceptable it's a small group of early adopters, and the cycle is long. At Sensible it's customers who need one good explanation. At Popular and Policy it's customers who already have a line item for it, and at Behind it's customers holding three quotes who want the cheapest one.
Where you should start
If you are self-funded, the answer is one band out, and the data is unusually clear about it.
| Founded at | Companies | Reached consensus | Fell behind |
|---|---|---|---|
| Policy | 621 | 91% still there | 9% |
| Popular | 328 | 88% | 12% |
| Sensible | 288 | 91% | 9% |
| Acceptable | 393 | 82% | 12% |
| Radical | 222 | 47% | 17% |
| Unthinkable | 177 | 17% | 12%, with 71% still out |
Sensible reached the middle as often as the companies that were born there, and it arrived with a position nobody else owned. Acceptable is close behind. Past that, the odds fall off a cliff and the thing that carries you is outside money.
Positioning In Each Band
Positioning can be reduced to one line your buyer will repeat. For [who] who [have this problem], [your name] is the [category they already know] that [outcome]. Unlike [the alternative], we [the one difference that matters].
The band changes which words go in the blanks.
At Policy and Popular, the category word is yours for free. Buyers already search for it. Your line is about the difference, and the difference is usually service, reviews, speed, or a guarantee. The alternative you name is a competitor.
At Sensible, the whole trick is to use the category word a Policy buyer already searches for, even though your idea sits one band further out. The client hears the familiar word and the familiar outcome. The delivery model that makes it better sits behind the headline where they do not need to see it. Done right, you can charge like you're out on the fringe while selling on the timeline of something in the middle. Costco did this with "warehouse." Home Depot did it with "hardware store." GEICO did it with "car insurance" and put the different part, no agent, in the ad instead of the category.
At Acceptable and further out, there is no category word yet, and if you invent one you will spend the first two years explaining it. The line names the outcome and the thing it replaces. "It's like X, but" is a sign you are here. The alternative you name is the old way of doing it, not a competitor.
At Behind, the mistake is to keep the noun. If the thing you sell is a noun a buyer can now get from a product, lead with the outcome instead, and put the noun inside the package. That is the move we made with our own agency. The headline went from "a custom website" to getting found and getting calls, and the site went inside the fee.
Go-to-market by Band
Understanding how to take your product to market is already a skill of its own, but understanding it alongside buyer psychology and cultural context is a super power. I've gone CRAZY SIMPLE on this one just to highlight some initial concepts. I'm absolutely not suggesting this is a holistic list.
Inbound leads at Policy and Popular. Demand already exists. Site pages, the Google Business Profile, paid search on buyer terms, answers for AI search, reviews. The 1,280 operating businesses at Policy win or lose on this lane and the service behind it. A plumber in Tulsa does not need outbound. They need to be the one who shows up when someone types the category and the city.
Outbound leads at Sensible and further out. Nobody is searching for your idea yet, so inbound returns nothing. What works here is a named list of fifty buyers with a five-touch sequence, three partners who already serve your buyer, and paid social aimed at a defined audience. The further out you are, the more of the sale is explaining, and explaining does not happen in a search result.
Recurring and rebound every band needs. Every band needs something recurring, like a plan, a retainer, or a service reminder, to build that all-sacred ARR. Ask for the review at the first win and send a win-back at day 90. The cheapest revenue you will ever get is from a customer you already have, and the companies that stayed inside the window all had it before the window moved. It doesn't necessarily get harder to do this by stage, BUT and this is a big one, it matters MUCH more to you in the earlier stages. When customers need explaining about your service, a referral or recurring upsell is the fastest path to revenue.
Behind gets a special rule. Do not expect to win the search for the noun; rank for the outcome. And if you can put a guarantee on it, the guarantee is your outbound opener, because nobody in your market has one. It turns out that is because nobody in your market has an instrument to measure the outcome.
How to sell it at each band.
The further out you sit, the more of the sale is explaining, and the closer in you sit, the more of the sale is choosing.
Selling at Policy. The buyer has already decided to buy the category. Your job is to be the easy choice. Answer the phone, quote the same day, put the reviews and the license where they can see them, and name the price without a dance. Do not pitch the category, they will think something is wrong with you. Objections are about trust and timing, not the idea, so the close is a date and a guarantee, not a demo. Whoever responds first wins more of these than whoever is best.
Selling at Popular. The buyer knows the category and has already gotten quotes. Sell based on the difference, and only one difference. Speed, a guarantee, a better crew, a cleaner process. Say it in the first thirty seconds and put it on the quote in writing. Expect the price objection and answer it with the difference, never with a discount. Case results with a number beat adjectives here. The close is a comparison the buyer can repeat to their spouse or their partner.
Selling at Sensible. The buyer gets it once it is explained, so the sale is one explanation done well. Open in the category word they already use, then show the better way inside it. Demos, a walkthrough, a before and after, a short pilot. The first objection is "how is this different from what I have," the second is "who else is doing it." Have one named customer ready for each. Price holds here, so do not lead with the entry tier. Lead with the target and let the premium tier make it look reasonable. Close on a first result they can feel inside thirty days.
Selling at Acceptable. You are selling to the handful of early buyers who like being early, and nobody else. Qualify hard for that person and stop chasing the rest. The sale is a story about where their market is going and proof you can get them there first. Expect a long cycle, a committee, and the question "what happens if you go away." Answer it with references, a pilot with an exit, and terms that shift risk to you. The close is a small paid pilot, not the full contract. Every pilot you land is also your next case study, so price it for the proof, not the margin.
Selling at Radical and beyond. Customers are not the buyer yet. Investors, partners, and a few believers are. The sale is a thesis about the world and a reason you are the team to prove it. At this stage you're running a proof process more than a sales process. Look for design partners who will use it for free and say so in public. Treat any revenue here as a good signal, and don't mistake a pilot for product fit. Closing takes belief and time, and the only thing that shortens it is proof that the window is moving.
Selling at Behind. The buyer is comparing quotes on a thing they can get cheaper elsewhere, so stop selling the thing. Reframe the conversation around the outcome in the first minute, show the instrument that measures it, and put the guarantee on the table before they ask for a discount. If they still only want the noun, let them go, that customer will churn to the cheaper version anyway. The ones who stay for the outcome are the ones worth having, and they will pay the target price for it.
What does the band do to your price, cycle, and cash?
The same position decides the money aspect of the business, and put plainly, understanding this could save your butt in a drought.
At Behind, buyers compare quotes, prices drift toward your entry tier, you compete on cost and speed, and margin shrinks every year. It's cheap to start, but the real cost shows up later when you have to re-bet.
At Policy and Popular, the market sets the price. Your target holds with better service or more reviews. Demand exists, so first revenue is weeks away. Most of your spend goes to standing out.
At Sensible, the target holds and the premium tier sells, because few direct comparisons exist. First revenue is one to three months out. Budget for the explaining: content, demos, proof.
At Acceptable, a premium is possible but the buyer pool is small. Three to nine months to the first sale. Twelve to twenty-four months of runway, or a core business paying the bills.
At Radical and beyond, price does not matter yet because volume is near zero. Revenue is years away and you'll need outside capital. If you don't have it, I wouldn't start here.
Arriving is the dangerous part
I traced 73 companies that reached consensus and then watched the window keep moving. Forty stayed inside it. Thirty-three fell behind. What separated them was timing.
Thirty-seven of the forty made the next bet while the old business was still paying. Fourteen launched a new product line. Nine shifted channels. Seven changed the business model. Four bought the next position. Three moved the core into a new market. Netflix built streaming while DVD mail was still growing. Adobe took a revenue dip to move to subscriptions. Only three of the 73 never had to move at all, Costco, Visa, and JPMorgan, and scale and regulation held them there.
Twenty-seven of the thirty-three rode the core until it was a commodity. The other six made the right move after the core had already slid, usually on debt. Kodak invented the digital camera in 1975 and shelved it to protect film. Blockbuster passed on Netflix for fifty million dollars.
The signs that the window is moving are usually easy to spot. Copycats show up, prices start falling, and buyers start asking for a cheaper version. Each one means your position is going mainstream and the clock on your next move has started. The rule we took from it: start one band out, and re-bet before you have to.
For example, the creative and marketing industry has been going through this for years. If you are racing to the bottom, you are now becoming a commodity and you have to do something significant to move your services to further out on the window.
You can't even really blame AI. For years, cameras, software, building apps, it all was becoming easier and easier - AI is just the final arrow through the heart of a struggling commoditized industry.
Test This On Your Offer
I'd encourage you to test this on your offer - contact me when you do, I want to know if these assumptions are right or wrong. It is my belief that if you skip one of these it shows up later as a pricing problem or a marketing problem.
One. Build the offer. Write it in one sentence: I help [who, specifically] get [the outcome they pay for] without [the pain they have now]. Find three companies already selling it, or the thing your buyer does instead, and write down their price, how they sell, and what their one-star reviews complain about. Decide how it gets sold, what proof a buyer can check without you, and what makes yes feel safe. For pricing, I usually go with the 3 tier model of: Set a target price, then 0.6 of it for a smaller-scope entry tier and 1.8 for a premium tier. This may not work if you're not in tech or a subscription, and you may need to try something else.
Two. Place it on the window. Five questions. Do buyers already search for this by name? Do they already pay someone for this exact thing? Can you explain it without "it's like X, but"? Can they buy it without changing a habit? Would your banker call it a normal business? Count the no answers. Zero is Policy or Popular. One is Sensible. Two is Acceptable. Three or more is Radical and beyond. Then three more. Five or more competitors? Buyers choosing mostly on price? Software, DIY, or a bigger player replacing it? Crowded and price-led is Policy. A yes on the last one means you may already be Behind. Then read your row in the money section above and check whether your target price, your time to first sale, and your cash on hand match the band. If they do not, move the offer or move the plan.
Three. Go to market. Write the positioning line in the buyer's words, using the category word a Policy buyer already searches for. Pick one inbound move, one outbound move, and one recurring move, with the band deciding which leads. Run those three and nothing else for 90 days.
Four. Read the answer at month three and month six. Before some of you shame me for this level of checking, yes you should be watching much closer than every 3 months, but save your big decisions for that period. Ask questions like, Which tier did they buy? If most chose entry, the value is not clear or you are closer to consensus than you thought. If premium sells often, raise the target. What are reviews and sales calls saying? Their words are your next positioning pass. Are copycats showing up? That is the market moving toward you, and the clock on your next bet. Re-place the idea on the window every six months.
Every position on the map is temporary. Plan for the window to move toward you, and then past you unless you find a way to stay ahead of it.
What the heck do I do with this?
If you've read this far, holy smokes. Appreciate you.
Here's the thing I'd do with this. Test it on your company, and treat it like one of the other 1,500 thinking models around business growth. It may help you find PMF faster. It may not.
The reality is that if this was a science, someone would have done it already. In my mind finding PMF is 50% art and 50% science and 100% grind.
What I can say though, is that most people today build ideas based on AI and public opinion. If you're getting it from public opinion and AI - refusing to think ahead - you'll only ever have ideas in the acceptable stages and lower. Finding something truly ahead of its time requires you to be okay with being ridiculed and risk failing.
These tools learn from what everyone has already said, so they're always going to hand you the middle of the window. That makes them useful for checking where the window is today and not much help figuring out where it's headed. I use them to check my placement, but I wouldn't let them pick the idea.
If you run this on your own company, hate my data, or wanna poke holes in the idea, reply and tell me where your dot landed. I will add it to the chart, and I would like to know whether the model holds up outside the companies I picked.